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ADVOCACY AND GENUINE AUTONOMY: THE
LAWYER'S ROLE WHEN THE CLIENT HAS A
RIGHT TO Do WRONG
LINDA RADZIK*
I.
Stephen Pepper has presented us with a disturbing scenario that
is likely to be quite common. He argues that lawyers and clients often
act together in ways that their moral convictions would prevent them
from acting individually! In cases like these, the lawyer tells herself,
"I am only acting at the behest of the client. This injustice is his
responsibility, not mine." At the same time, the client assigns
responsibility to the attorney. 2 "I would never have considered doing
this, but my lawyer says I should. She's the expert, she says that I am
within my rights. Still, I'm glad she's the one who will actually do it
and not me." The lawyer sees her role as limited to showing the client
his legal options.3 She comforts herself with the thought that the
responsibility rests fully on the client. The client confuses his legal
options with his moral options. He comforts himself by trusting in the
lawyer's expertise and experience.4 I will call this scenario "Pepper's
Problem."
Pepper's Problem occurs, according to the author, because the
law is designed to work only in the aggregate Though our laws
usually bring results that are just when one looks at the results as a
whole, there are many things that one can do legally but not justly.6
* Linda Radzik is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University.
Her work on ethics and rationality has been published in Law and Philosophy and
American Philosophy Quarterly.
1. See Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyer's Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S.
TEX. L. REV. 181,188-92 (1999).
2. See id. at 189-90.
3. See id. at 189.
4. See id. at 189-90.
5. See id. at 186.
6. See id. at 185.
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Bankruptcy laws enable some debtors to walk away from debts that
they are actually capable of paying to creditors who are financially
worse off than the debtor.' In cross-examination, lawyers can feign
disbelief in witnesses they know to be truthful, often in ways that are
humiliating to the witnesses.8 Divorce proceedings can be made so
unpleasant that the client's spouse will accept a settlement that is
actually unfair.9  Civil and criminal law both provide ample
opportunity for attorneys to exercise their clients' right to do wrong.' °
In this context, Pepper's Problem can arise despite the fact that
neither the client nor the lawyer approves of their joint action.
In Pepper's assessment, as in mine, both the client and the lawyer
are at fault in this scenario. Pepper argues that the client has primary
responsibility for the action, but that the lawyer is also to blame.1 She
has the responsibility to make the client aware that he must take
responsibility. She is obliged to ensure that the client understands the
difference between a legal right and a moral right.12 In other words,
the attorney needs to make it clear to the client that he must act
autonomously.
In the following pages, I would like to explore the nature of the
attorney's responsibility to help her client reach autonomous
decisions." To do this, I will review the work of some prominent
medical ethicists on the same issue in doctor-patient relationships.
Doctors are also advocates for the interests of others. They also can
be obliged to enact another person's right to do wrong. Doctors and
patients can also find themselves in a medical version of Pepper's
Problem, where both parties feel pressed by the other to do something
wrong.
The comparison with the doctor-patient relationship will help us
see that autonomy is harder for a client to achieve than many lawyers
recognize. If a lawyer is to be a virtuous advocate for her client, she
must understand what her client needs in order to act autonomously. 4
7. See id. at 189.
8. See id. at 189-190.
9. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1062 (1976) (discussing potential immoral conduct
by lawyers in their relationships with their clients).
10. See Pepper, supra note 1, at 188-89.
11. See id. at 191.
12. See id.
13. Fried wrote, "The lawyer acts morally [when] he helps to preserve and express
the autonomy of his client vis-d-vis the legal system." Fried, supra note 9, at 1074.
14. In this way, I hope to add to Robert J. Araujo's observations about the virtuous
lawyer in his paper in this volume. See Robert J. Araujo, The Lawyer's Duty to Promote
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When the lawyer succeeds in doing this, I will argue, she can often
avoid Pepper's Problem.
II.
Like a lawyer, a doctor's job is to provide information and
expertise in service of the interests of another person. A continuing
debate in medical ethics is just how much control the patient should
have in this relationship. A generation ago, most doctors would
simply inform patients of the actions that would be taken to promote
the patient's health. This paradigm has been largely overturned now
by the Patient Rights movement. The new view is that the patient
must be the one to make the decisions about her own health and
treatments; or, where that is not possible, the patient's family should
have the decision making power. Most doctors now approve of this
change in the doctor-patient relationship, but there are cases that
make them doubt its wisdom.
Doctors sometimes find themselves in situations where the
patient makes what the doctor believes to be the wrong choice.
Patients refuse treatments that could extend their lives in favor of less
invasive, less powerful treatments. They refuse to consistently take
medications that are important to their health but that have difficult
side effects. Parents sometimes choose to let severely disabled
newborns die of minor health problems (e.g., an intestinal blockage)
that the doctor knows he can easily cure. In cases like these, the
Patient Rights movement has given the patient, in the doctor's eyes, a
right to do wrong.15
The doctor believes he has an obligation to respect his patient's
autonomy. On the other hand, he also has an obligation to protect her
health. These obligations can come into conflict. What can the doctor
do in cases like these?
Medical ethicists Ezekiel J. Emanuel and Linda L. Emanuel have
the Common Good: The Virtuous Law Student and Teacher, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 83 (1999).
15. The patient's choice might be seen as "wrong" in two different senses. Most
commonly, doctors worry about patients making choices that are imprudent or irrational-
choices that are in conflict with the patient's best interests. (On most accounts a person
cannot morally wrong herself.) In some medical contexts, though, the doctor may be
worried about choices that are wrong in the sense of being immoral or unjust. The latter
include cases where medical decisions are made by family members in the name of patients
who are incompetent or immature, pregnancies (where the one allegedly wronged is the
fetus), or situations in which a patient's choice about her own treatment will affect the
health of other people (e.g., a single mother who will die or be incapacitated because of a
refusal of treatment, a person with a sexually transmitted disease who refuses to be treated
and yet intends to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse).
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identified four models of the doctor patient relationship.'6 Each
model tries to balance the patient's autonomy and the doctor's
obligation to protect the patient's life and health. The Emanuels
argue that the differences between the models are best explained by
different underlying theories of the nature of autonomy."
The first model of the doctor-patient relationship is the
Paternalistic Model.8 Here, the doctor's role is to figure out which
treatments will best promote the patient's health. He then informs
the patient that this is the best thing to do. The doctor considers
himself an advocate for the patient because he sees himself as working
in the patient's best interests. He believes he respects the patient's
autonomy because he is choosing what the patient would choose for
herself if only she had the medical expertise to do so. 9 Note that the
paternalistic doctor believes the patient's interests to be clear and
objective. She needs health and long life. Given that these fall under
the doctor's area of expertise, he is the one who should select the
means to bring about these ends. The only thing the patient actively
does to express her autonomy is assent to the doctor's decisions."
The Paternalistic Model has come into disfavor because it has
come to be understood that the doctor's values and the patient's
values may differ.2' Doctors focus on health and longer life. The
paternalistic doctor assumes that these are the patient's most
important values, he has taken a pledge to protect these interests, and
16. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-
Patient Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221-26 (1992).
17. See id. at 2221.
18. See id.; cf R.M. Veatch, Models for Medicine in a Revolutionary Age, 5
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5-7 (1972) (describing paternalistic attitudes and their applicability
to medical practitioners); A.A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A, SYSTEM IN
TRANSITION 235 (1976) (offering a brief description of the paternalistic physician). -.
19. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 16, at 2224.
20. Sometimes this minimal expression of autonomy, the patient's assent, is not even
required by the doctor. Paternalists will usually argue that a refusal of treatment can be
overridden in cases where the patient is clearly choosing in violation of her own interests.
Cf STONE, supra note 18, at 237-39 (emphasizing that patients should be given the best
possible care no matter what the circumstances); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in
MORALITY AND THE LAW 110-13 (Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed., 1971) (stating that an
argument can be made that it is immoral not to provide patients necessary care). Other
paternalists even deny the patient the opportunity to make the wrong choice by refusing to
tell the patient her actual diagnosis, if it is thought that the truth will be more than the
patient can bear. See Charles C. Lund, The Doctor, the Patient, and the Truth, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 55-57 (John D. Arras & Bonnie Stienbock, eds., 4th ed.
1995).
21. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 16, at 2224; Alan Goldman, The Refutation
of Medical Paternalism, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 58-66 (John D. Arras
& Bonnie Stienbock, eds., 4th ed. 1995).
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he acts accordingly. But patients value many other things besides
health and long life. They want to be free from suffering. They often
want to spend their final days with their families rather than in
hospitals. If given the option, many will refuse a chance at a longer
life if it means their mental faculties will deteriorate in such a way that
they will become strangers to their loved ones and their loved ones
will become strangers to them. Doctors cannot simply assume that
health and long life are the main goals of treatment.22 The
Paternalistic Model fails, in the end, to respect autonomy because it
does not recognize individual differences in values.
Doctor-patient relationships that follow the Paternalistic Model
are at high risk for Pepper's Problem. Not only do patients often
value something other than long life, the doctors do as well. But
doctors who see their job as preventing the patient's death feel
trapped by that obligation into doing something even the doctor sees
as wrong. Time after time, terminally ill patients have been subjected
to long, painful deaths when all parties involved would have preferred
stopping treatment.
The second model for the doctor-patient relationship is the
Informative Model.3 Here the doctor's role is to present the patient
with all of the medical options that she has and let the patient choose
from them. The doctor will describe the side effects, provide the
relevant statistics regarding success and failure, and offer any other
medical information that is needed. The doctor who follows the
Informative Model shows respect for patient autonomy by leaving the
choice of treatment to the patient.24 The doctor does not presume to
know what the patient values. He realizes that the patient can only
make that choice in a truly autonomous way if she has all the data that
she needs, so he provides the medical expertise. But then the doctor
steps out of the picture and leaves the choice completely in control of
the patient.25
The major benefit of the Informative Model is that it recognizes
that different patients have different priorities. It recognizes that
health and long life are not the only factors that must be considered.
But many doctors are also unsatisfied with the Informative Model.26
22. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 16, at 2224.
23. See id. at 2221; cf. Veatch, supra note 18, at 5-7 (discussing the need for medical
practitioners to disseminate information to patients in a more concise, clear manner).
24. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 16, at 2221.
25. See id.
26. Cf Lund, supra note 20, at 55-57 (expressing the idea that patients often make
irrational decisions because they are unable to fully cope with information from their
1999]
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Medical information is often difficult for patients to process. Doctors
worry that their patients do not really understand their options. They
know that patients who are sick are also often afraid and depressed.
They fear that patients will panic and run away from invasive but
successful procedures. They fear suicidal impulses. They fear that
patients will fall into denial and place unreasonable hope in
inefficacious remedies. According to many, the Informative Model
leaves the patient too much leeway to make the wrong choice. 7
If the patient is, in fact, ineffectively evaluating her options, her
choice will be wrong by her own rights. She will likely come to regret
her choices. So, here too, Pepper's Problem comes up. The action
taken is one of which both the doctor and, eventually, the patient will
disapprove.
Some will say that allowing the patient the freedom to make the
wrong choice is the only way to respect her autonomy. But others
contend that this response rests on a fallacious understanding of
autonomy.28 A decision made out of terror or confusion is not fully
autonomous. Emotional disturbance can cause people to lose sight of
their own values. If a doctor wants to help his patient make
autonomous choices, it is argued, he must recognize these dangers and
help minimize their effects.29
The third model tries to correct this problem by giving the doctor
a more active role in helping the patient evaluate her medical options.
It is known as the Interpretative Model." Here, the doctor is required
not only to give the patient comprehensive information about
different treatment options, but also to talk explicitly with the patient
about how these options serve her values. The doctor tries to get the
patient to identify which of her values come into play in this
situation-health and long life, as well as comfort, time with her
family, and so forth. He then helps her think through which of the
treatments best serve these values." As the name suggests, the
doctor's role is not only to provide medical information, but to help
the patient interpret that information in light of her own values. The
ideal interaction between the patient and doctor is dialectical. They
reason together to find the solution that best fits the patient's ends.32
physician).
27. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 16, at 2224-25.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 2221-22.
31. See id.
32. See id.
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Implicit in this model is the idea that a patient is not acting
autonomously unless her actions really do connect with her values.
The fourth model, the Deliberative Model, also encourages the
doctor to engage in a dialectic with the patient about her values.33
Here, the doctor not only shows how the treatment options relate to
the values that the patient has, he can also bring up values that the
patient should have. If a patient is discounting her family's reaction,
the doctor can argue for the legitimacy of their interests to the
patient." If the patient is inclined to abort a female fetus because she
prefers to have a son, the doctor can ask her to think about the joys
that can come from raising a girl, the wider opportunities girls and
women have these days, etc. While a doctor following the
Interpretive Model must restrict himself to discussing the values the
patient already has, the Deliberative Doctor can discuss values the
patient should adopt." The doctor's goal is not to preach or coerce,
but to persuade. The doctor will avoid intolerance of religious and
cultural differences by limiting himself to comments that raise moral
considerations any reasonable person can recognize. 6
Proponents of the Deliberative Model point out that people's
values are in a constant state of development. Very few of us have
moral beliefs that are fully settled. Most of us will admit that there
may be things of great importance that we have overlooked or
misunderstood. Furthermore, a health crisis is often such a novel
situation for a patient that it will require her to form completely new
values. A breast cancer patient may be forced for the first time to
consider the use of cosmetic surgery. Parents told that their unborn
child has Down's Syndrome face a life very different from the one
they have expected. A decision made on the basis of half-formed or
hastily chosen values is less than fully autonomous, according to the
33. See id. at 2222.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. I have broadened the Deliberative Model beyond the description given by the
Emanuels. They present the Deliberative Doctor as offering persuasion only on health-
related values. See id. at 2222, 2226. I allow for a broader range of moral concerns to be
mentioned. In saying that the doctor must limit himself to raising considerations any
reasonable person would recognize, I mean to require toleration of reasonable differences
in religious, political and moral opinions. To fill out this notion more fully, we can appeal
to John Rawls' notion of the original position and the veil of ignorance. See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85-110 (1971). A doctor following the Deliberative Model should
only raise moral considerations that would be considered relevant by parties discussing the
situation from behind a veil of ignorance-i.e. parties who did not know their own religion,
race, gender, sexual preference, political affiliation, wealth or social status.
37. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 16, at 2222.
1999]
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Deliberative Model. 8  Values themselves must be chosen
autonomously if the patient's best interest is to be served. A good
doctor will help the patient in this process.
III.
These same four models have their equivalents in attorney-client
relationships. Lawyers might see their advocacy relationship to their
clients in paternalistic terms. Here, the lawyer's role is to pick the
legal strategies that are most likely to serve the client's objective
interests. The interests that lawyers most frequently assign to their
clients are, as Pepper writes, the maximization of wealth and
freedom. 9 The lawyer will decide what will most likely serve those
ends. The client's role in this relationship is limited to accepting or
rejecting the lawyer's conclusions.
Many practicing lawyers seem to see their role along the lines of
the Paternalistic Model. Unfortunately, the problems that plague
paternalism in the medical context also taint its use in the attorney-
client relationship. In a paternalistic relationship, the advocate simply
assumes that the client most wants wealth and freedom. In pursuing
these goals, there are sometimes steps that can be taken which are
legal but unjust. Moreover, the assumption may be mistaken. The
client may place greater weight on having a reputation for fairness,
taking responsibility for his own actions, preserving a connection with
the community, or protecting the environment. A paternalistic lawyer
who makes a false assumption about her client's values will often end
up acting in conflict with the client's true interests. In other words,
the Paternalistic Model leaves the door wide open for the disturbing
scenario that Professor Pepper has described. The client may not be
any happier with the unjust course of action than the lawyer is.
Alternatively, a lawyer might follow the Informative Model. In
this case, she will see her role as providing the client with thorough
descriptions of all of his legal options. It is then left to the client to
choose among these options in accordance with his own values. The
lawyer provides information and expertise, but the decisions are made
by the client. As in the medical context, the Informative Model is
preferable to the Paternalistic Model because the advocate does not
simply, and perhaps mistakenly, assume that she knows what her
client values.
38. See id.
39. See Pepper, supra note 1, at 188-89.
[Vol. 40:255
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The Informative Model may be the most commonly practiced
version of the lawyer-client relationship. It also can be criticized from
the point of view of client autonomy. As in the case with medical
choices, legal choices are often so complex and so emotionally
charged that the client may not make the choice in line with his actual
values. He may misunderstand how his legal options relate to his
values. He may be temporarily blinded by fear, anger, or (in more
ordinary corporate contexts) simple inattention. He may lose sight of
values that he actually holds dear by focusing only on short-term
prospects or the excitement of legal battle. Once again, the attorney
and client are left vulnerable to Pepper's Problem. Because the client
might make an unjust decision in a less than autonomous way, he may
come to be as regretful as the lawyer.
Pepper's Problem could be avoided in most situations if lawyers
adopted one of the other two models for the lawyer-client
relationship. If a lawyer followed the Interpretive Model she would
have the freedom to discuss the client's values with him. The lawyer
would not simply provide information about the client's options, she
would also help the client evaluate how well those options fit with the
client's own values. This will increase the chance that the client will
make his decisions in line with his actual values, and so decrease the
chance that he will later regret his actions.
A lawyer following the Deliberative Model will go one step
further. She will not only talk about the legal options with respect to
the client's values, but she will also try to persuade the client to adopt
some important moral values that he has overlooked or discounted.
The goal is to prevent a situation in which a client acts on a value that
he holds unreflectively, a value that he may later come to regret.
It should be emphasized that the Deliberative Model leaves the
final decision to the client. The attorney may respectfully raise new
moral concerns. She can try to persuade the client of their
importance. She will also be sure to help the client understand his
own values and how they are served by different legal strategies. But
then the decision will be made by the client. The lawyer will ensure
that the client knows he has the power. She will also make sure that
he understands that he will carry the full moral responsibility for his
choice.
IV.
If an attorney is to be a good advocate for her client, she should
1999]
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reject both the Paternalistic and Informative Models."° Both suffer
from overly simplistic conceptions of client autonomy. The choice
that the responsible lawyer faces, then, is between the Interpretive
and the Deliberative Models. Which of these should shape her
conception of her obligations to her client?
The Deliberative Model's more stringent conception of
autonomy is appealing.41 For instance, when we were children, most
of us pronounced our commitment to career choices we consider
outlandish now. We wanted to be test pilots, or rock stars, or the only
5'5", 110-pound woman to play in the NFL. We do not consider our
current careers as academics or lawyers to be failures or cases of
"backsliding" or "copping out" because our childhood choices were
not autonomous. It was not (or not only) that we lacked enough
information back then to know what the life of a rock star is really
like. Our childhood decisions were not autonomous because our
values were not fully formed. We did not yet have the sophistication
or experience to reflect properly on the importance of privacy, the
rigors of travel, or the shallowness of most rock music.
People who dropped out of school or married too young often
beg not to be held accountable for those mistakes because they did
not know what they were choosing, or the value of what they were
giving up. People who were raised with a narrow perspective on life
and were never exposed to people who belong to other religions,
cultures or political ideologies often resent those who over-protected
them. The parent is charged with having prevented the child from
fully developing as a person-from fully becoming an autonomous
moral agent. In all these examples, a lack of reflection on values
undermines autonomy. In the latter examples, we may insist that the
agent's decisions are autonomous enough to hold the person
responsible for her own choices; but, still, we recognize that the
decisions fall short of our ideal of autonomy.
If full autonomy requires reflection on values, then an attorney
will serve her client's interests by encouraging that sort of reflection.
40. Though she accepts one of the latter two models, a lawyer's interactions with her
client may often look from the outside as though they follow the Paternalistic or the
Informative Model. A lawyer who knows her client very well or who is dealing with a very
simple case can act in the client's interests without having to enter into any explicit
discussion about the client's options or values.
41. For other accounts of autonomy that recognize the need for reflection on values,
see IMMANUEL KANT, An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?" in KANT'S
POLITICAL WRITINGS 85 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970) (1784); JOEL
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. III: HARM TO SELF 22-23
(1986); RAWLS, supra note 36, at 513-20.
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However, we should recognize that there are also dangers involved in
an attorney-client relationship that follows the Deliberative Model.
There is sometimes a fine line between persuasion and coercion.42
Attorneys are often seen as authoritative by their clients. Criminal
defendants whose freedom is at stake or clients involved in divorce,
custody battles or other emotionally charged disputes, may be in
emotionally fragile states. They may be easily intimidated and simply
give in to what they perceive to be the lawyer's wishes. Clients may
feel embarrassed or resentful if their attorneys express disapproval of
their values. This could adversely affect the outcome of the case.
Moral discussion can slide from persuasion into coercion, even if that
is not the attorney's intention. In that case, the patient's autonomy
(the acclaimed goal of this process) will be undermined, not enhanced.
One might argue that the possible benefits of an attorney's
assistance in reflection on values are far outweighed by the dangers of
coercion. From the point of view of an interest in client autonomy,
the benefits of deliberation may not be worth the risk. This may well
be right for a wide range of cases. Here, the Interpretive Model is
best. However, I am not willing to completely give up on the
Deliberative Model.
Clients differ, so do lawyers. In some cases, the delicate art of
persuasion can be achieved. As Pepper has pointed out, differences in
intelligence, education, strength, security, and familiarity with the law
will make clients more or less vulnerable to coercion.43 Lawyers with
more developed personal skills will be more capable of expressing
moral concerns in ways that clients will perceive as constructive and
helpful. In cases where an attorney can participate in moral
deliberation with little risk of coercion, she should. The attorney's
obligation to be an advocate for her client's interests requires it.
In situations where coercion is a greater danger, there is still
much that an attorney can do to encourage deliberation about values.
An attorney who is following the less ambitious, safer Interpretive
Model must limit herself to providing the client with information
about his legal options and discussing how those options connect to
the values that the client already has. In order to do this, the attorney
must find out what the client's values are. Skillfully posed questions
about what the client in fact values can subtly encourage reflection
about what he should value. Moral deliberation can also be spurred
by the way the attorney communicates information to the client about
42. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 16, at 2225.
43. See Pepper, supra note 1, at 192-96.
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the likely consequences of his choices. Consequences can be
communicated flatly (e.g., "Your spouse will receive 30 % of the
estate and take on 50% of the debts"), or they can be made vivid to
the client ("Your spouse will receive $10,000, leaving her nothing after
the debts are paid. Most likely she will have to move in with her
sister's family, sell her car and quit school a year short of her degree.")
As Pepper-has written, tone of voice and body language can also have
a great, but non-coercive, effect on a client." These subtle attempts to
make the client reflect on her values are not manipulative, in my view,
because their purpose is not to control the client, but to put him in
better control of his own life. These techniques are justified-even
required-by the lawyer's obligation to help her client make
autonomous decisions.
V.
The Interpretive and the Deliberative Models do not provide a
solution to the general problem of an attorney enacting a client's right
to do wrong. Clients may choose to do wrong in ways that are fully
autonomous, on either account of autonomy. In these situations, the
lawyer's obligation to be an advocate for the client will continue to
cause her moral worries.45 I have no solution to that problem. It is a
cost of the advocacy system, which, on the whole, is a just and
honorable institution.
However, I do think that the Interpretive and Deliberative
Models offer help in the subclass of cases that I have described with
the label "Pepper's Problem." Though there may be many clients
who will autonomously choose to do wrong, there are also may who, if
only they are able to achieve full autonomy with respect to the
situation, will make the morally correct choice. By helping their
clients make decisions in a fully autonomous way, lawyers can
minimize the number of situations in which they must act on a client's
right to do wrong, and they can do so in a way that does not
compromise their status as advocates for their clients' interests. In
fact, by following the Interpretive and (at times) the Deliberative
Models, the attorney will be a better advocate for her client's
44. See id. at 204
45. In many cases, the only thing the lawyer can do to avoid enacting the client's right
to do wrong is to remove herself from the case. Cf. Teresa Stanton Collett, The Common
Good and the Duty to Represent: Must the Last Lawyer in Town Take Any Case?, 40 S.
TEX. L. REV. 137 (1999) (asserting that attorneys should use moral judgment when
deciding whether to represent a potential client).
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